More children die from the indirect impact of armed conflict in Africa than those killed in the crossfire and on the battlefields, according to a new study by Stanford researchers. 

The study is the first comprehensive analysis of the large and lingering effects of armed conflicts — civil wars, rebellions and interstate conflicts — on the health of noncombatants.

The numbers are sobering: 3.1 to 3.5 million infants born within 30 miles of armed conflict died from indirect consequences of battle zones between 1995 and 2005. That number jumps to 5 million deaths of children under 5 in those same conflict zones.

“The indirect effects on children are so much greater than the direct deaths from conflict,” said Stanford Health Policy's Eran Bendavid, senior author of the study published today in The Lancet.

The authors also found evidence of increased mortality risk from armed conflict as far as 60 miles away and for eight years after conflicts. Being born in the same year as a nearby armed conflict is riskiest for young infants, the authors found, with the lingering effects raising the risk of death for infants by over 30 percent.

On the entire continent, the authors wrote, the number of infant deaths related to conflict from 1995 to 2015 were more than three times the number of direct deaths from armed conflict. Further, they demonstrated a strong and stable increase of 7.7 percent in the risk of dying before age 1 among babies born within 30 miles of an armed conflict.

The authors recognize it is not surprising that African children are vulnerable to nearby armed conflict. But they show that this burden is substantially higher than previously indicated. 

“We wanted to understands the effects of war and conflict, and discovered that this was surprisingly poorly understood,” said Bendavid, an associate professor of medicine at Stanford Medicine.  “The most authoritative source, the Global Burden of Disease, only counts the direct deaths from conflict, and those estimates suggest that conflicts are a minuscule cause of death.”

Paul Wise, a professor of pediatrics at Stanford Medicine and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, has long argued that lack of health care, vaccines, food, water and shelter kills more civilians than combatants from bombs and bullets. 

This study has now put data behind the theory when it comes to children.

“We hope to redefine what conflict means for civilian populations by showing how enduring and how far-reaching the destructive effects of conflict have on child health,” said Bendavid, an infectious disease physician whose co-authors include Marshall Burke, PhD, an assistant professor of earth systems science and fellow at the Center on Food Security and the Environment.

“Lack of access to key health services or to adequate nutrition are the standard explanations for stubbornly high infant mortality rates in parts of Africa,” said Burke. “But our data suggest that conflict can itself be a key driver of these outcomes, affecting health services and nutritional outcomes hundreds of kilometers away and for nearly a decade after the conflict event”. 

The results suggest efforts to reduce conflict could lead to large health benefits for children.

The Data

The authors matched data on 15,441 armed-conflict events with data on 1.99 million births and subsequent child survival across 35 African countries. Their primary conflict data came from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset, which includes detailed information about the time, location, type and intensity of conflict events from 1946 to 2016. 

The researchers also used all available data from the Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 35 African countries from 1995 to 2015 as the primary data sources on child mortality in their analysis.

The data, they said, shows that the indirect toll of armed conflict among children is three-to-five times greater than the estimated number of direct casualties in conflict. The indirect toll is likely even higher when considering the effects on women and other vulnerable populations.

Zachary Wagner, a health economist at RAND Corporation and first author of the study, said he knows few are surprised that conflict is bad for child health.

“However, this work shows that the relationship between conflict and child mortality is stronger than previously thought and children in conflict zones remain at risk for many years after the conflict ends.” 

He notes that nearly 7 percent of child deaths in Africa are related to conflict and reiterated the grim fact that child deaths greatly outnumber direct combatant deaths.

“We hope our findings lead to enhanced efforts to reach children in conflict zones with humanitarian interventions,” Wagner said. “But we need more research that studies the reasons for why children in conflict zones have worse outcomes in order to effectively intervene.” 

Another author, Sam Heft-Neal, PhD, is a research fellow at the Center for Food Security and the Environment and in the Department of Earth Systems Science. He, Burke and Bendavid have been working together to identify the impacts of extreme climate events on infant mortality in Africa.

Stanford researchers have determined that more than 15 million children are living in high-mortality hotspots across 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, where death rates remain stubbornly high despite progress elsewhere within those countries.

The study, published online Oct. 25 in The Lancet Global Health, is the first to record and analyze local-level mortality variations across a large swath of Sub-Saharan Africa.

These hotspots may remain hidden even as many countries are on track to achieve one of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals: reducing the mortality rate of children under 5 to 25 per 1,000 by 2030. National averages are typically used for tracking child mortality trends, allowing left-behind regions within countries to remain out of sight — until now.

The senior author of the study is Eran Bendavid, MD, MS, an assistant professor of medicine and core faculty member at Stanford Health Policy. The lead author is Marshall Burke, PhD, an assistant professor of Earth System Science and a fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute’s Center on Food Security and the Environment.

Decline in under-5 mortality rate

The authors note that the ongoing decline in under-5 mortality worldwide ranks among the most significant public and population health successes of the past 30 years. Deaths of children under the age of 5 years have fallen from nearly 13 million a year in 1990 to fewer than 6 million a year in 2015, even as the world’s under-5 population grew by nearly 100 million children, according to the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation.

“However, the amount of variability underlying this broad global progress is substantial,” the authors wrote.

“Mortality numbers are typically tracked at the national level, with the assumption that national differences between countries, such as government spending on health, are what determine progress against mortality,” Bendavid said. “The goal of our work was to understand whether national-level mortality statistics were hiding important variation at the more local level — and then to use this information to shed light on broader mortality trends.”

The authors used data from 82 U.S. Agency for International Development surveys in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, including information on the location and timing of 3.24 million births and 393,685 deaths of children under 5, to develop high-resolution spatial maps of under-5 mortality from the 1980s through the 2000s.

Using this database, the authors found that local-level factors, such as climate and malaria exposure, were predictive of overall patterns, while national-level factors were relatively poor predictors of child mortality.

Image

Temperature, malaria exposure, civil conflict

“We didn’t see jumps in mortality at country borders, which is what you’d expect if national differences really determined mortality,” said co-author Sam Heft-Neal, PhD, a postdoctoral scholar in Earth System Science. “But we saw a strong relationship between local-level factors and mortality.”

For example, he said, one standard deviation increase in temperature above the local average was related to a 16-percent higher child mortality rate. Local malaria exposure and recent civil conflict were also predictive of mortality.

The authors found that 23 percent of the children in their study countries live in mortality hotspots — places where mortality rates are not declining fast enough to meet the targets of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals. The majority of these live in just two countries: Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In only three countries do fewer than 5 percent of children live in hotspots: Benin, Namibia and Tanzania.

As part of the research, the authors have established a high-resolution mortality database with local-level mortality data spanning the last three decades to provide “new opportunities for a deeper understanding of the role that environmental, economic, or political conditions play in shaping mortality outcomes.”  The database, available at http://fsedata.stanford.edu, is an open-source tool for health and environmental researchers, child-health experts and policymakers.

“Our hope is that the creation of a high-resolution mortality database will provide other researchers new opportunities for deeper understanding of the role that environmental, economic or political conditions play in shaping mortality outcomes,” said Bendavid.  “These data could also improve the targeting of aid to areas where it is most needed.”

The research was supported by a grant from the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. 

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A Global Perspective on Food Policy

I applaud Mark Bittman, Michael Pollan, Ricardo Salvador, and Olivier de Schutter for advocating the introduction of a national food policy in the U.S. Greater emphasis in our current farm legislation on nutrition, health, equity, and the environment is clearly warranted and long overdue. As the authors note, Americans’ access to adequate nutrition at all income levels affects educational and health outcomes for the nation as a whole. Poor nutrition thus plays a role in determining the level and distribution of economic and social wellbeing in the U.S, now and in the future. It is surprising that no one within the large circle of Presidential hopefuls has raised the topic of food, not just agriculture, as a major political issue for the 2016 election.

The U.S. is not unique. Virtually every country with an agrarian base has, at some point in history, introduced agricultural policies that support farmers and provide incentives for them to produce major commodities. At the time, governments have been able to justify these policies on several grounds: national security (avoiding excess dependence on foreign nations for food), economic growth (using agricultural surpluses as an engine of economic growth), and social stability (keeping its population well-fed to avoid social unrest). Once agricultural policies are implemented, they typically give rise to institutions and vested political interests that perpetuate a supply-side orientation to food and agriculture. In the U.S., the political institutions that govern food and agriculture have their roots in historical political precedents that date back to the 1860s, and later to the 1930s when the New Deal was promulgated. Farm interests have been entrenched in the U.S. political system for quite some time, and they cannot be easily removed.

There is a general rule for successful policies: Align incentives with objectives. A corollary to this principle is that objectives change over the course of economic development. For the United States in earlier eras, and for many developing economies in recent decades, meeting basic calorie needs has been the first order of business. This objective has been largely achieved through public investments in infrastructure (irrigation, roads), research and development, commodity support programs, incentives for private agribusiness development, and other supply-side measures.

With successful agricultural growth and rising incomes, many countries face a new set of food and nutrition challenges: eliminating “hidden hunger” (deficiencies in iron, vitamin A, calcium, zinc and other micronutrients), and abating the steady rise in obesity that results from a transition to diets rich in energy-dense carbohydrates, fats, and sugar. Hidden hunger affects some three billion people worldwide. It is prevalent among low-income households in almost all countries, impairs cognitive and physical development (especially among infants up to two years of age) and thus limits a nation’s educational and economic potential. Meanwhile, rates of obesity now surpass rates of energy-deficient hunger throughout the world, even in developing nations.

The objectives of food and agricultural policies in virtually all countries need to shift, on balance, from promoting staple food supplies to enhancing nutrition. I am not suggesting an abandonment of agriculture, but rather an enrichment of agriculture with more crop diversity to support the nutritional needs of all people. If improved nutrition is the objective, what are the correct incentives? Proper incentives will differ among countries, but will inevitably require a fundamental change in institutional structure. With a shift from supply- to demand orientation, there needs to be a transition from Ministries of Agriculture to Ministries of Food. After all, the main goals of a Ministry of Agriculture are to increase the volume of agricultural production and to improve economic growth in the agricultural sector. The main goal of a Ministry of Food, by contrast, is to enhance the nutrition and food security of the entire population.

Bittman, Pollan, Salvador, and de Schutter emphasize that replacing the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) with a “U.S. Department of Food, Health, and Wellbeing” would be difficult at best. It would require unprecedented political will and cooperation among parties. The same can be said for institutional change in agricultural ministries throughout the world. Regardless of the challenges, however, nothing will change until the conversation surrounding food policies, politics, and institutions takes a major turn.