This paper provides an original account of global land, water and nitrogen use in support of industrialized livestock production and trade, with emphasis on two of the fastest growing sectors, pork and poultry. Our analysis focuses on trade in feed and animal products, using a new model that calculates the amount of "virtual" nitrogen, water and land used in production but not embedded in the product. We show how key meat importing countries, such as Japan, benefit from "virtual" trade in land, water and nitrogen, and how key meat exporting countries, such as Brazil, provide these resources without accounting for their true environmental cost. Results show that Japan's pig and chicken meat imports embody the virtual equivalent of 50% of Japan's total arable land, and half of Japan's virtual nitrogen total is lost in the US. Trade links with China are responsible for 15% of the virtual nitrogen left behind in Brazil due to feed and meat exports, and 20% of Brazil's area is used to grow soybean exports. The complexity of trade in meat, feed, water and nitrogen, is illustrated by the dual roles of the US and the Netherlands as both importers and exporters of meat. Mitigating environmental damage from industrialized livestock production and trade depends on a combination of direct pricing strategies, regulatory approaches and use of best management practices. Our analysis indicates that increased water and nitrogen use efficiency and land conservation resulting from these measures could significantly reduce resource costs.

Climate change, as an environmental hazard operating at the global scale, poses a unique and "involuntary exposure" to many societies, and therefore represents possibly the largest health inequity of our time. According to statistics from the World Health Organization (WHO), regions or populations already experiencing the most increase in diseases attributable to temperature rise in the past 30 years ironically contain those populations least responsible for causing greenhouse gas warming of the planet. Average global carbon emissions approximate one metric ton per year (tC/yr) per person. In 2004, United States per capita emissions neared 6 tC/yr (with Canada and Australia not far behind), and Japan and Western European countries range from 2 to 5 tC/yr per capita. Yet developing countries' per capita emissions approximate 0.6 tC/yr, and more than 50 countries are below 0.2 tC/yr (or 30-fold less than an average American). This imbalance between populations suffering from an increase in climate-sensitive diseases versus those nations producing greenhouse gases that cause global warming can be quantified using a "natural debt" index, which is the cumulative depleted CO2 emissions per capita. This is a better representation of the responsibility for current warming than a single year's emissions. By this measure, for example, the relative responsibilities of the U.S. in relation to those of India or China is nearly double that using an index of current emissions, although it does not greatly change the relationship between India and China. Rich countries like the U.S. have caused much more of today's warming than poor ones, which have not been emitting at significant levels for many years yet, no matter what current emissions indicate. Along with taking necessary measures to reduce the extent of global warming and the associated impacts, society also needs to pursue equitable solutions that first protect the most vulnerable population groups; be they defined by demographics, income, or location. For example, according to the WHO, 88% of the disease burden attributable to climate change afflicts children under age 5 (obviously an innocent and "nonconsenting" segment of the population), presenting another major axis of inequity. Not only is the health burden from climate change itself greatest among the world's poor, but some of the major mitigation approaches to reduce the degree of warming may produce negative side effects disproportionately among the poor, for example, competition for land from biofuels creating pressure on food prices. Of course, in today's globalized world, eventually all nations will share some risk, but underserved populations will suffer first and most strongly from climate change. Moreover, growing recognition that society faces a nonlinear and potentially irreversible threat has deep ethical implications about humanity's stewardship of the planet that affect both rich and poor.

The integration of the agricultural and energy sectors caused by rapid growth in the biofuels market signals a new era in food policy and sustainable development. For the first time in decades, agricultural commodity markets could experience a sustained increase in prices, breaking the long-term price decline that has benefited food consumers worldwide. Whether this transition occurs, and how it will affect global hunger and poverty, remain to be seen. Will food markets begin to track the volatile energy market in terms of price and availability? Will changes in agricultural commodity markets benefit net food producers and raise farm incomes in poor countries? How will biofuels-induced changes in agricultural commodity markets affect net consumers of food? At risk are over 800 million food-insecure people, mostly in rural areas and dependant to some extent on agriculture for incomes, who live on less than $1 per day and spend the majority of their incomes on food. An additional 2 to 2.5 billion people living on $1 to $2 per day are also at risk, as rising commodity prices could pull them swiftly into a food-insecure state.

A concept note about setting up an international program for studying the effects of the emergence of biofuels on global poverty and food security. 

The recent global expansion of biofuels production is an intense topic of discussion in both the popular and academic press. Much of the debate surrounding biofuels has focused on narrow issues of energy efficiency and fossil fuel substitution, to the exclusion of broader questions concerning the effects of large-scale biofuels development on commodity markets, land use patterns, and the global poor. There is reason to think these effects will be very large. The majority of poor people living in chronic hunger are net consumers of staple food crops; poor households spend a large share of their budget on starchy staples; and as a result, price hikes for staple agricultural commodities have the largest impact on poor consumers. For example, the rapidly growing use of corn for ethanol in the U.S. has recently sent corn prices soaring, boosting farmer incomes domestically but causing riots in the streets of Mexico City over tortilla prices. Preliminary analysis suggests that such price movements, which directly threaten hundreds of millions of households around the world, could be more than a passing phenomenon. Rapid biofuels development is occurring throughout the developed and developing world, transforming commodity markets and increasingly linking food prices to a volatile energy sector. Yet there remains little understanding of how these changes will affect global poverty and food security, and an apprehension on the part of many governments as to whether and how to participate in the biofuels revolution.

We propose an international collaborative effort to:

• Understand and quantify the effects of expanding biofuels production on agricultural commodity markets, food security, and poverty;
• Develop training programs and policy tools to harness the benefits and mitigate the damages from such expansion on both local and global scales; and
• Build an international network of scholars and government officials devoted to studying and managing biofuels development and its social consequences

In this report, we seek to meet the specific objectives of the first phase of China's study. The key goal of this study in China is to prepare evidence-based policy advice concerning the implications and opportunities for fruit producers during a period of a boom in horticulture demand and a restructuring of downstream markets and commercialization. Hence, the research in Phase 1 concentrates on identifying the determinants and consequences of restructuring of the horticulture sector in China. The analysis is conducted on three levels: macro (the policy issues and the national business environment), meso (the different chain segments and villages) and micro (household level). Because of space limitation and timing of the research the linkages between the first two levels are analysed in this report. The micro study will be carried out during the upcoming phase.

The research for this report is structured into two parts: a.) the national-meso level and b.) the local-meso level. In part 1 key policy issues, broad fruit supply chain issues and key stakeholders are identified. This part is intended to set the stage for the analysis done in part 2 and the forthcoming household study. The goal of part 1 is to analyze the evolution of China's restructured supply chain at a national level over a period of the past 10 or more years. With this background, the objective of part 2 is to study in more depth the restructuring changes that are occurring inside China's rural communities and within the markets. It also will provide context for the forthcoming micro-level study. In particular, we primarily study how marketing supply chains are operating and evolving within villages; inside wholesale markets and inside supermarkets.

The supermarket revolution has arrived in China and is spreading as fast as or faster than anywhere in the world. As the demand for vegetables, fruit, nuts and other high valued products has risen, urban retailers are handling increasingly more of these high value commodities. The experience of many developing countries suggests that there could be serious distributional impacts of the emergence of supermarkets. And, in China, as elsewhere in the world, there is concern among policy makers and academics that poor, small farmers might be excluded from the market for horticulture commodities.

The main goal of our paper is to understand what types of farmers have been able to participate in the horticultural revolution, how they interact with markets and how supply chains affect their production decisions and incomes. We also want to understand if (and if so, then how) the rise of supermarkets have changed supply chains. Our analysis uses spatially sampled data from 200 communities and 500 households in the Greater Beijing area and supplemented by data collected in Shandong Province, China's fruit and vegetable basket. In contrast to fears of some researchers, we find small and poor farmers have actively participate in the emergence of China's horticulture economy. Moreover, there has been almost no penetration of modern wholesalers or retailers into rural communities. We also conducted surveys and interviews in wholesale markets and with procurement agents in Beijing supermarket chains and document the fact that supply chain shifts have only affected the downstream segments of food markets and China's wholesale markets (midstream in the food supply chain) are only being affected marginally.