The extent to which armed conflicts—events such as civil wars, rebellions, and interstate conflicts—are an important driver of child mortality is unclear. While young children are rarely direct combatants in armed conflict, the violent and destructive nature of such events might harm vulnerable populations residing in conflict-affected areas. A 2017 review estimated that deaths of individuals not involved in combat outnumber deaths of those directly involved in the conflict, often more than five to one. At the same time, national child mortality continues to decline, even in highly conflict-prone countries such as Angola or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With few notable exceptions, such as the Rwandan genocide or the ongoing Syrian Civil War, conflicts have not had clear reflections in national child mortality trends.

 The Global Burden of Disease study estimated that, since 1994, conflicts caused less than 0·4% of deaths of children younger than 5 years in Africa, raising questions about the role of conflict in the global epidemiology of child mortality. The extent to which conflict matters to child mortality therefore remains largely unmeasured beyond specific conflicts. In Africa, conflict-prone countries also have some of the highest child mortality, but this might be a reflection of generalised underdevelopment resulting in proneness to conflict as well as high child mortality, rather than a direct relationship. In this analysis we aimed to shed new light on the effects of armed conflict on child mortality in Africa. We established the effects on child mortality of armed conflict in whom conflict-related deaths are not the result of active involvement in conflict, but of other consequences of conflict. We examined the duration of lingering conflict effects, and the geographical breadth of the observed effects, using geospatially explicit information on conflict location and number of conflict-related casualties. We then used our findings to estimate the burden of armed conflict on children younger than 5 years in Africa.

Climate-induced shocks in grain production are a major contributor to global market volatility, which creates uncertainty for cereal farmers and agribusiness and reduces food access for poor consumers when production falls and prices spike. Our study, by combining empirical models of maize production with future warming scenarios, shows that in a warmer climate, maize yields will decrease and become more variable. Because just a few countries dominate global maize production and trade, simultaneous production shocks in these countries can have tremendous impacts on global markets. We show that such synchronous shocks are rare now but will become much more likely if the climate continues to warm. Our results underscore the need for continued investments in breeding for heat tolerance.

Ending world hunger is a universal goal, yet progress and social awareness of the issue waxes and wanes in the course of broader political and economic developments. The massive famine in China under Chairman Mao’s 1958–62 Great Leap Forward, a succession of severe droughts and associated famines in India in 1965–66, and the political violence that accompanied regime change in Indonesia in 1964–67 left tens of millions of people starving and drew global attention to the threat of food insecurity. What emerged from these events was an international commitment to agricultural technology transfers, water resource development, and foreign assistance – partly in the spirit of humanitarian goodwill and partly in pursuit of long-term geopolitical and economic interests revolving around the Cold War. Whatever the motivation, the outcome over the ensuing decades was more than a doubling of staple cereal yields in Asia, and a steady decline in real (inflation-adjusted) cereal prices.

Despite these gains, a second, quite different, rallying cry for food security resounded in 2007–8 as international grain prices spiked, food riots erupted in numerous cities throughout the developing world, and the global economy headed into a deep recession. Several factors sparked this crisis, but unlike the earlier periods of dire food shortages, the root causes included unwieldy financial markets and escalating demands for food, animal feeds, and fuel (including biofuels) in a globalized economy. This episode prompted new analyses of the connection between global commodity markets and food security, the political-economy foundations of agricultural development, and the differential impacts of food prices on net producers and net consumers. In the five-year period from 2007 to 2012, international cereal prices were highly unstable, varying by as much as 300 percent.

Today, international agricultural markets have settled at relatively low prices, but civil conflicts, extreme climate events, and other natural disasters are blocking the path toward ending hunger. In February 2017, the United Nations declared a famine in South Sudan, as war and economic collapse ravaged the newly independent nation. Although the famine officially ended in mid-2017, food emergencies and severe undernourishment still threaten tens of millions of people in South Sudan, Yemen, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria, due to a combination of civil conflict, prolonged droughts, and occasional floods. On the surface, it seems incomprehensible that there could be such difficulty in addressing these looming famines at a time when global cereal production and stocks are at historical highs. But the problem is not a matter of food supply; the problem is war.

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Large-scale crop monitoring and yield estimation are important for both scientific research and practical applications. Satellite remote sensing provides an effective means for regional and global cropland monitoring, particularly in data-sparse regions that lack reliable ground observations and reporting. The conventional approach of using visible and near-infrared based vegetation index (VI) observations has prevailed for decades since the onset of the global satellite era. However, other satellite data encompass diverse spectral ranges that may contain complementary information on crop growth and yield, but have been largely understudied and underused. Here we conducted one of the first attempts at synergizing multiple satellite data spanning a diverse spectral range, including visible, near-infrared, thermal and microwave, into one framework to estimate crop yield for the U.S. Corn Belt, one of the world's most important food baskets. Overall, using satellite data from various spectral bands significantly improves regional crop yield predictions. The additional use of ancillary climate data (e.g. precipitation and temperature) further improves model skill, in part because the crop reproductive stage related to harvest index is highly sensitive to environmental stresses but they are not fully captured by the satellite data used in our study. We conclude that using satellite data across various spectral ranges can improve monitoring of large-scale crop growth and yield beyond what can be achieved from individual sensors. These results also inform the synergistic use and development of current and next generation satellite missions, including NASA ECOSTRESS, SMAP, and OCO-2, for agricultural applications.