FSI scholars approach their research on the environment from regulatory, economic and societal angles. The Center on Food Security and the Environment weighs the connection between climate change and agriculture; the impact of biofuel expansion on land and food supply; how to increase crop yields without expanding agricultural lands; and the trends in aquaculture. FSE’s research spans the globe – from the potential of smallholder irrigation to reduce hunger and improve development in sub-Saharan Africa to the devastation of drought on Iowa farms. David Lobell, a senior fellow at FSI and a recipient of a MacArthur “genius” grant, has looked at the impacts of increasing wheat and corn crops in Africa, South Asia, Mexico and the United States; and has studied the effects of extreme heat on the world’s staple crops.
In the 21st century, mapping and monitoring the occurrence of soil degradation will be an important component of successful land management. Remote sensing, with its unique ability to measure across space and time, will be an increasingly indispensible tool for assessing degradation. However, much of the recent experience and progress in using remote sensing and other geospatial technologies to map soil degradation is reported outside of the peer-reviewed literature. This motivated the organization of a special collection of papers focused on remote sensing of soil degradation, to highlight recent successes, common challenges, and promising new approaches. This introductory paper provides an overview of the papers, gaps in knowledge, and future research directions. Across several regions and types of degradation, many assessments to date have relied heavily on data from the Landsat satellite sensor. Many approaches have also relied at some point on subjective visual interpretation, either of the satellite imagery itself or to provide field data used to train models that use satellite data. While subjectivity is not necessarily bad, it precludes repeatability and makes it even more important to rigorously test model estimates with independent data. Overall, it remains quite challenging to find robust relationships between remote sensing measures and soil degradation, particularly for slight to moderate levels of degradation. There have nonetheless been some clear successes, and there remains great potential for progress. Promising directions outlined in the papers include using multi-year measures of vegetation condition, combining different sensor systems including optical and radar data, and using advanced statistical techniques such as Bayesian networks and decision trees.
The ongoing expansion of oil palm plantations in the humid tropics, especially in Southeast Asia, is generating considerable concern and debate. Amid industry and environmental campaigners' claims, it can be hard to perceive reality. Is oil palm a valuable route to sustainable development or a costly road to environmental ruin? Inevitably, any answer depends on many choices. But do decision makers have the information they require to avoid pitfalls and make the best decisions? This review examines what we know and what we don't know about oil palm developments. Our sources include academic publications and ‘grey' literature, along with expert consultations. Some facts are indisputable: among these are that oil palm is highly productive and commercially profitable at large scales, and that palm oil demand is rising. Implementing oil palm developments involves many tradeoffs. Oil palm's considerable profitability offers wealth and development where wealth and development are needed-but also threatens traditional livelihoods. It offers a route out of poverty, while also making people vulnerable to exploitation, misinformation and market instabilities. It threatens rich biological diversity-while also offering the finance needed to protect forest. It offers a renewable source of fuel, but also threatens to increase global carbon emissions. We remain uncertain of the full implications of current choices. How can local, regional and international benefits be increased while costs are minimised? While much important information is available, it is often open to question or hard to generalise. We conclude this review with a list of pressing questions requiring further investigation. Credible, unbiased research on these issues will move the discussion and practice forward.
In this chapter, we focus specifically on agricultural risks and uncertainties
related to climate variability and global climate change from a policy viewpoint.
Policymakers have little control over the weather, which is driven by very short-run
(hourly to daily) patterns in atmosphere and ocean circulation. With good scientific
information, however, policymakers in many regions can anticipate longer-run
(monthly, yearly, decadal) climate variability and climate change reflected in patterns of
temperature and precipitation. Such climate fluctuations involve structural dynamics in the physical system that can be modeled and projected with varying degrees of certainty
over different spatial and temporal scales. To the extent that climate variability and
change in the mean state can be projected, governments can then facilitate adaptation;
that is, they can augment markets by implementing policies to promote domestic food
security via trade (e.g., arrange for food imports when crop production is expected to
decline domestically), investments (e.g., fund crop research or improvements in
irrigation infrastructure), and early-warning systems or safety-net programs for
vulnerable populations within their countries.
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Springer in "Uncertainty and Environmental Decision Making"
Presentation from the session session "Biofuels, Tropical Deforestation, and Climate Policy: Key Challenges and Opportunities" at the annual AAAS meeting, Feb 14 2009.
Higher growing season temperatures can have dramatic impacts on agricultural productivity, farm incomes, and food security. We used observational data and output from 23 global climate models to show a high probability (>90%) that growing season temperatures in the tropics and subtropics by the end of the 21st century will exceed the most extreme seasonal temperatures recorded from 1900 to 2006. In temperate regions, the hottest seasons on record will represent the future norm in many locations. We used historical examples to illustrate the magnitude of damage to food systems caused by extreme seasonal heat and show that these short-run events could become long-term trends without sufficient investments in adaptation.
This paper
presents data from six of the first countries incorporated into the
Agricultural Lives of the Poor project: Ghana, Guatemala, India, Malawi, Uganda,
and Vietnam. Datasets were selected
based on availability and depth of detail on consumption expenditures, sources
of income, and agricultural practices. Each of these survey components is necessary in order for ALP
to focus on net consumption/production at the household level, and to
understand expenditure and consumption behavior. Net consumption and production data of individual crops and
food groups is further disaggregated by subgroups formed on characteristics
that include economic status, household attributes, livelihood strategies,
calories available, landholding, tenure types, and agricultural input use.
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Program on Food Security and the Environment, Stanford University
Berkeley and Stanford - Climate change could increase the likelihood of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa by over 50 percent within the next two decades, according to a new study led by a team of researchers at University of California, Berkeley, Stanford University, New York University and Harvard University, and published in today's (Monday, Nov. 23) online issue of the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS).
The study provides the first quantitative evidence linking climate change and the risk of civil conflict. It concludes by urging accelerated support by African governments and foreign aid donors for new and/or expanded policies to assist with African adaptation to climate change.
"Despite recent high-level statements suggesting that climate change could worsen the risk of civil conflict, until now we had little quantitative evidence linking the two," said Marshall Burke, the study's lead author, a graduate student at UC Berkeley's Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, and research associate at the Program on Food Security and the Environment. "Unfortunately, our study finds that climate change could increase the risk of African civil war by over 50 percent in 2030 relative to 1990, with huge potential costs to human livelihoods."
"We were definitely surprised that the linkages between temperature and recent conflict were so strong," said Edward Miguel, professor of economics at UC Berkeley and faculty director of UC Berkeley's Center for Evaluation for Global Action. "But the result makes sense. The large majority of the poor in most African countries depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, and their crops are quite sensitive to small changes in temperature. So when temperatures rise, the livelihoods of many in Africa suffer greatly, and the disadvantaged become more likely to take up arms."
Understanding the causes and consequences of civil strife in much of the African continent has been a major focus of the social sciences for decades, said Miguel, given the monumental suffering has resulted from it.
In the study, the researchers first combined historical data on civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa with rainfall and temperature records across the continent. They found that between 1980 and 2002, civil wars were significantly more likely in warmer-than-average years, with a 1 degree Celsius increase in temperature in a given year raising the incidence of conflict across the continent by nearly 50 percent.
Building on this historical relationship between temperature and conflict, the researchers then used projections of future temperature and precipitation change to quantify future changes in the likelihood of African civil war. Based on climate projections from 20 global climate models, the researchers found that the incidence of African civil war could increase 55 percent by 2030, resulting in an additional 390,000 battle deaths if future wars are as deadly as recent wars.
All climate models project rising temperatures in coming decades, said David Lobell, study co-author and an assistant professor of environmental earth system science at Stanford and center fellow at Stanford's Program on Food Security and the Environment, a joint program of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Woods Institute for the Environment.
"On average, the models suggest that temperatures over the African continent will increase by a little over 1 degree Celsius by 2030," he added. "Given the strong historical relationship between temperature rise and conflict, this expected future rise in temperature is enough to cause big increases in the likelihood of conflict."
To confirm that this projection was not the result of large effects in just a few countries or due to overreliance on a particular climate model, the researchers recalculated future conflict projections using alternate data. "No matter what we tried - different historical climate data, different climate model projections, different subsets of the conflict data - we still found the same basic result," said Lobell.
It's easy to think of climate change as a long way off, said the researchers, but their study shows how sensitive many human systems are to small increases in temperature, and how fast the negative impacts of climate change could be felt.
"Our findings provide strong impetus to ramp up investments in African adaptation to climate change, for instance by developing crop varieties less sensitive to extreme heat and promoting insurance plans to help protect farmers from adverse effects of the hotter climate," said Burke.
Applying findings from this study could prove useful to policy makers at the upcoming Copenhagen negotiations in December in determining both the speed and magnitude of response to climate change, the authors said.
"If the sub-Saharan climate continues to warm and little is done to help its countries better adapt to high temperatures, the human costs are likely to be staggering," said Burke.
Armed conflict within nations has had disastrous humanitarian
consequences throughout much of the world. Here we undertake the first
comprehensive examination of whether global climate change will exacerbate
armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. We find strong historical linkages
between civil war and temperature on the continent, with warmer years leading
to significant increases in the likelihood of war. When combined with climate
model projections of future temperature trends, this historical response to
temperature suggests a roughly 60% increase in armed conflict incidence by
2030, or an additional 390,000 battle deaths if future wars are as deadly as
recent wars. Our results suggest
an urgent need to reform African governments' and foreign aid donors' policies
to deal with rising temperatures.